Thinking assignment: Are we ready?

With all the think tanks in and around the Beltway, the shear mass of reports, position papers and policy recommendations is leaden, yet every now then there's a vein of gold. In this case, we have a paper that examines the federal homeland security apparatus and makes some very specific recommendations that are relevant to all: Wormuth, C.E., and Witkowsky, A., 2008, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or Not)? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 85 pp. Free download here.

Christine Wormuth and Anne Witkowsky waste no time getting to the point in Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: the first line of the report states, "America is not prepared for the next catastrophe." From there, their report analyzes the current federal preparedness apparatus and makes a series of policy recommendations.

Aside from some admirable frankness, at this point it probably sounds like much of the leaden mass. What sets it apart? Rather than vanishing into esoterica, the recommendations target the same attributes that make all organizations work better: clear chain of command, clear roles and responsibilities, improved interjurisdictional relationships, executive oversight and accountability, strategic planning, and a sustainable preparedness process.

Among the authors' recommendations:

• Merge the National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC). It makes little sense not to consider homeland security and national security within a holistic context and mechanism.
  
• Establish a clear chain of command within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including consolidating the positions of Principal Federal Officer and Federal Coordinating Officer. One could argue that the woes FEMA experienced a few years ago started before 9/11 and DHS (and one would have a strong case), but even since the post-Katrina reforms the chain of command has been, as the authors describe it, “murky.” The multiple revisions of the National Response Framework and its recent predecessors, along with the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA), have generally been positive, but senior federal oversight is still counterintuitive and counterproductive.
  
• Resolve the ambiguity surrounding the Defense Department by clearly stating that it serves in a support role for domestic disaster response. Aside from being a political hot-button, a critical function of plans is to establish roles, responsibilities and authorities. Ambiguity should not be mistaken for flexibility.
  
• Improve the process for deploying federal assets while retaining states’ constitutional authorities. See the aforementioned item, on the issues of political sensitivity and ambiguity, with an additional context: This is more than territoriality (something about constitutional rights), but it can easily appear to be otherwise. An actual or pending disaster is not the time to settle these issues.
  
• Integrate strategic planning and budget development. Even if the authors’ proposed merger of NSC and HSC were not to occur, it would still make sense to create a sustainable strategic planning process for homeland security and develop a budget process that crosses agency and disciplinary lines. Another way of stating this would be "Adopt best practices in scientific research and local government at the federal level."
  
• Make the Target Capabilities List (TCL) more realistic. As the authors point out, the TCL holds all areas equal, not distinguishing among size or degree of urban development. As with many aspects of emergency response, non-urban (and particularly) rural needs and capabilities are both substantially different from their city cousins and not well accounted for in much of the federal boilerplate.
  
• Reform the DHS grants programs, linking to real priorities. Of all the recommendations in the report, this could be the most obvious and necessary, and among the least likely. The authors’ exact wording is "well managed, transparent, highly credible, and tightly linked to federal priorities." Most homeland security grant programs saw criteria well preceding standards and best practices, and catch-up is a slow and uncertain process. This is more than linking to the TCL; it requires a new way of doing business and establishing accountability.
  
• Introduce new "very senior" federal officials to disaster response. Another best practice at every level of government and the private sector is essential, and that's some type of effective orientation to characteristics of a disaster and executive roles and responsibilities before, during and after. As with any other critical function, whether performing CPR, using a fire extinguisher or representing a Cabinet position in the federal executive branch, it’s better to have one’s initial exposure before the crisis.
  
• Make the TOPOFF exercises more effective. The authors suggest more of a no-notice format, but it’s questionable how realistic that is with an exercise that’s more than a year in the planning. More to the point is the fact that the TOPOFF exercises struggle for relevance and have become more marketing than true exercise. The authors’ recommendations target the federal level, where a no-notice exercise might be more realistic, but there are more and deeper challenges than just this aspect.
  
• Create a more professional and sustainable homeland security talent pool. This represents several recommendations, including strengthening the regional FEMA offices at the operational and executive level and incorporating National Guard resources, but the key is to build out the National Security Professional Program through a combination of funding, recruitment, rotations and just plain relevance.

The likelihood of all or even most of the recommendations being adopted is admittedly slim, but we have seen unprecedented change in the past six years, from the creation of DHS to the subsequent restructuring in PKEMRA (and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, or PAHPA), to the appearance and large-scale rewriting of the National Incident Management System and National Response Framework (nee Plan). Some of this was due to the desire for a quick fix to assuage public outcry, but some was recognition that the system needed changes guided by substantive input. This report offers a direction worth considering.